Opennessthe free flow of goods, capital, people, and knowledgetransmits technology and generates economic growth across nations. Two hundred years ago, imports of machinery and the emigration of skilled workers helped carry the industrial revolution from Britain to Europe. Japan and the United States were both highly successful at borrowing established technology and exploiting linkages with more advanced industrial countries to become major players in world markets. In the past forty years, East Asia has grown rapidly through the expansion of trade.
cal change are twofold. First, increasing global competition raises the demand for new technology. Second, the supply of new technology for industrializing countries is determined largely by the degree to which they are integrated with the global economy. New products and processes are transmitted through imported inputs and capital goods, sold directly through licensing agreements, and transmitted through direct foreign investment or export contacts with foreign buyers. Yet a market-friendly approach also requires government action to help producers master new technology. Governments must ensure the educational base, which is essential for developing technological capability; promote competition; coordinate efforts for quality control; and protect intellectual property rights.
Flows of capital and skilled workers across nations continue to provide an important avenue for technology transfer. The East Asian countries have successfully assimilated technology by sending students abroad, exploiting linkages with overseas nationals, and encouraging exchanges with re-88 search centers. Direct foreign investment (DFI) has contributed to technology transfer and fostered export growth in economies such as Brazil and Mexico. Yet the gains from foreign investment depend critically on the policy climate. DFI in a protected sector, for example, is likely to generate net losses instead of welfare gains.
By increasing competition and expanding access to technology, trade generates benefits which may even exceed the gains from improved resource allocation. Yet almost all industrial and developing countries have restricted trade to promote industry and raise revenue. In retrospect, these objectives would have been better attained in other ways. Where protection accompanied rapid development, as in East Asia, competition was maintained in external and domestic markets. These countries preserved incentives for technological change by using export success as a yardstick for performance. Trade intervention was also moderate and restricted in time, minimizing costly distortions from protection.
Channels of technology transfer
Technology is the knowledge that leads to improved machinery, products, and processes. Additions to this knowledge reduce the real cost of production and lead to the introduction of new products. Technology also includes the knowledge embodied in management know-how. Chapter 2 showed that growth in productivity, the best proxy for technological change, has accounted for as much as 30 percent of GDP growth in the East Asian countries.
Integration with the global trading system affects technological change in two ways. First, it improves the supply of new technology. Second, it raises the demand for new technology.
Supply-side channels
Technology is embodied in imported inputs and capital goods, sold directly through licensing agreements, and transmitted through direct foreign investment, labor movements, or contacts with foreign buyers. In all these ways, openness increases the supply of new products and processes.
TRADE. Technology is embodied in many kinds of imported inputsranging from capital equipment and turnkey plants to sophisticated components for electronic assembly. One explanation for the observed relation between high trade shares and GDP growth is that increasing trade allows countries to import capital goods. A comparison of Box 5.1 Export takeoffs: two success stories
The two stories below suggest that successful entry into export markets requires a combination of access to information, the appropriate incentive structure, and domestic entrepreneurship.
Garment exports in Bali, Indonesia
Foreign exchange earnings in the Bali garment industry increased from less than $3 million in 1975 to more than $65 million in 1987. The industry began in the early 1970s as a tourist-oriented sales effort by local businesses and expatriates who financed their travels by returning home with suitcases full of clothing. These expatriates, who generally had little business experience, provided limited but inexpensive capital, foreign contacts, and international mobility. Several of these early joint ventures were quickly replicated once their profitability was demonstrated.
A recession in 1981 led many local producers to reevaluate their informal relationships with local expatriates and turn to more highly skilled foreign partners, who were drawn to Bali by its new reputation as a profitable production site. By 1986 Bali had a sufficiently strong reputation as a boutique supplier that many foreign buyers were willing to purchase garments under more arms-length arrangements. Yet stricter enforcement of established immigration laws, which regulate the employment of expatriates, seems to have contributed to a temporary slowdown in the improvement of the quality of garment exports.
foreign technology imports by Argentina, Brazil, India, the Republic of Korea, and Mexico in the 1960s and 1970s shows that Korea relied extensively on imports of embodied technology. In 1985, India increased access to imported capital goods and components for the electronics sector, and it liberalized restrictions on the entry and exit of firms. Since then, out-of-factory prices have fallen as much as 60 percent for some products, and exports of electronics have increased.
The second source of technology transfer from trade occurs through exporting (Box 5.1). Exposure to international markets keeps exporters informed of new products, and foreign buyers are an important source of information that can be used to upgrade technology. In a survey of 113 Korean export enterprises in the 1970s, 20 percent of the firms cited contacts with foreign buyers and suppliers as important; only 8 percent considered licenses and technical agreements important. From contacts with foreign buyers, firms received blue-
Rice exports in Viet Nam
In the mid-1980s, Viet Nam was a net importer of rice and requested international food aid several times during the decade to avert famine. By 1989, it had become the third largest exporter of rice, following the United States and Thailand. Rice trade shifted from net imports of 280,000 tons in 1988 to net exports of nearly 1.5 million tons in 1989, representing one-third of total hard currency exports.
No major change in weather accounted for this reversal in performance. Rather, a series of interrelated policy reforms transformed Viet Nam from a net importer to a net exporter of rice. During 1988 and 1989, agriculture was decollectivized and rice returned to family-farm production. Price controls were eliminated, and a large real devaluation of the currency in 1989 strengthened financial incentives to export. Finally, trade institutions were reorganized to eliminate state monopolies in imports and exports, which introduced competition among the mostly state-owned trading companies.
The lessons from these two case studies are quite different. Traditional reforms (price decontrol, privatization, and devaluation) transformed Viet Nam from a net importer to a net exporter of rice. In Bali, access to information on international markets, technical management, and capital provided the vital push.
prints and specifications, information on the production techniques and technical specifications of competing products, and feedback on the design, quality, and technical performance of exported products. China's heavy reliance on foreign trade corporations to mediate trade arrangements between Chinese enterprises and world markets has lessened the degree to which exporters have gained access to free technical assistance. Recent reforms, however, have greatly increased the involvement of manufacturing enterprises in trade and should facilitate technology transfer.
BUYING TECHNOLOGY THROUGH LICENSING. Concern about the monopoly power of technology suppliers, combined with balance of payments problems, led many developing countries to control the flow of disembodied technology and restrict royalty payments in the 1960s and 1970s. In India, restrictions on the size and time allowed for making royalty payments encouraged suppliers to favor lump-sum transfers. Yet by discouraging long-term relationships between suppliers and buyers, this form of payment made suppliers less responsible for ensuring successful technology transfer. Other countries sought to limit payments for technology imports by restricting access to several firms, which in turn discouraged competition. In contrast, Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITT) reinforced interfirm rivalry by making sure that foreign technologies were available to a number of domestic firms.
Trade flows and the licensing of foreign technologies allow countries to avoid the cost of duplicating established technologies. Restrictive policies on technology imports in Brazil, China, and India have frequently led to intensive scientific activity that could have been accelerated through greater use of established technologies developed abroad.
The demand for technology
In a more competitive environment, firms respond to international competition by trying more and more to minimize costs. This may simply lead to better use of established technology, or to efforts to acquire and adapt new technology. In Turkey, which liberalized trade and reformed its financial sector during the 1980s, the private sector has accelerated technology importsembodied in machinery that is available through licenses or technical agreementsas well as the purchase of designs and know-how.
By distorting relative prices, protection has often led to the costly adoption of capital-intensive 90 techniques in economies with abundant labor. In Côte d'Ivoire, the textile sector was developed in the 1960s primarily through direct foreign investment, which was induced by income tax and import duty exemptions, interest subsidies, high tariffs, and restrictive import licensing. Subsidized credit, by lowering the cost of capital, led to more capital-intensive plants. Firms' choice of sophisticated technology, which required a high level of expatriate employment, also inflated their wage bill. These high production costs were passed on to consumers in a protected market. In contrast, the textile industry in Japan developed as a highly labor-intensive sector, using imported secondhand machinery modified to substitute labor for capital. In Japan and the Republic of Korea, the technology for textile production became capital-intensive only when relative prices changed and labor became the scarce factor.
An escalated tariff structure can also affect the choice of technology. In the Philippines, as in many other countries, the more processed the product, the higher its import duties. This has encouraged assembly and packing operations that are heavily dependent on imported materials and equipment. Typically, governments respond with local-content regulations requiring finished products to contain a certain share of domestically produced components. Local content rules are often applied across the board, without regard for comparative advantage, further reducing the competitiveness of the assembled products.
Export competition, like import competition, also forces firms to the forefront of technological developments. One of Brazil's vehicle-components firms, Metal Leve, entered the international market in 1965 to use up excess capacity and exploit fiscal and credit incentives. The entrepreneurial ability of the firm's leadership and the firm's entry into international markets created a dynamic process of technological change and expanding export shares, driven by foreign demand for high quality. Exporting also strengthens the incentive to adopt new technology by increasing the returns from innovation through expanded market opportunities. In the computer industry, for instance, firms must target global markets from the beginning in order to make their investments profitable.
Government technology policy
One of the clearest lessons of Japanese and East Asian experience is the value of a strategy of importing, and building on, established technology from abroad. Countries which rely on imported technology have generally made very strong internal efforts to diffuse and develop technology. This ability to select, diffuse, and build on imported technologysometimes referred to as technological capabilityis also determined by policy action in several areas, in addition to openness. One of these is education (discussed in detail in Chapter 3). The others are domestic competition (also discussed in Chapter 4), the macroeconomic framework (discussed in detail in Chapter 6), information services, norms and standards, intellectual property, and research and development. DOMESTIC COMPETITION. Innovation and the diffusion of technology are promoted by domestic competition, especially if the domestic market is large. One study of the United States in the early nineteenth century showed that as navigable inland waterways expanded, patent activity increased. Access to larger markets and more regional competition sped up the pace of innovation. A recent study of successful industries in six European countries, Japan, Korea, Singapore, and the United States found that domestic competition was a key to global success (Porter 1990) . In Japan, almost every sector that became a major exporter on world markets had numerous domestic competitorsthe machine tool industry alone has more than 100 manufacturers. Domestic competition is important even in industries with substantial economies of scale (for example, the chemical industry in Germany, the car and truck industries in Sweden, and pharmaceuticals in Switzerland).
Barriers to internal competitionlicensing restrictions limiting entry, pricing policies, and bankruptcy or labor laws regulating exit, in addition to tariffs and nontariff barriersoften discourage technological change (see Chapter 4). In India's fertilizer sector, where competition has been virtually eliminated by government controls on entry and by pricing policies which pass on higher costs, older plants using obsolete processes survive despite operating at less than 30 percent capacity. In Europe's computer industry, sheltered national markets were handed over to "national champion" firms that never left their protected markets.
Yet market-friendly government policies may mean more than removing barriers to internal competition. Governments may need to use antitrust provisions to ensure that producers and distributors do not collude or exploit monopoly power. Import competition generally provides a powerful check on collusive practices, but it may not be sufficient if import distributers have monopoly power or goods are nontraded. Yet multilateral agreements negotiated through the GATT and the World Intellectual Property Organization would be preferable to case by case bilateral efforts. This would provide a more comprehensive global approach and would minimize the threat of trade retaliation. Intellectual property protection is most critical for areas in which industrializing countries would benefit from industrial country research, such as the prevention of tropical diseases. Research in industrializing countries is often based on extensions of established designs and processes, which could also be protected. Access to licenses for foreign innovations could also be actively promoted. Industries in developing countries could seek to limit restrictive clauses in their international licensing agreements, such as those which ban exports. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT. In agriculture, the rate of return on publicly sponsored crop research has typically ranged between 30 and 60 percent (see Chapter 4). Yet the returns from publicly sponsored research in industry have probably not been so high. Studies suggest that Japanese success in developing new technologies results more from improving incentives to private industry than from expanding government-subsidized programs.
Governments in developing countries often spend a large share of the resources available for technology transfer on national research and development institutions. In many cases, as in India and Thailand, they have had little effect. Particularly in low-income countries, a large share of research and development could better be used to assimilate and monitor technology development abroad. Yet government-sponsored R&D centers are more likely to follow the interests of their staff in basic research. The Republic of Korea has made such centers more accountable to their users by forcing them to increase share of revenues from private contracts.
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: AN ASSESSMENT. Is openness equally important at all levels of development? In Africa, strong protection of industry and reliance on public enterprises discouraged competition, leading to low rates of productivity growth. Countries of all income levels could create the demand for new technology by fostering competition and building the educational base needed to absorb changes in the marketplace. There is a critical need for broadly based primary and secondary education, combined with on-the-job training programs. In 1986, only 20 percent of the school-age population (13 percent for women)
were enrolled in secondary schools in SubSaharan Africa. Despite heavily subsidized university education, Africa has skill shortages in science, engineering, auditing, and higher-level accounting and management. Low-income countries also need to encourage partnerships with firms which have gained experience in adapting technology and marketing. The recent export success of Mauritius in garments may be traced to a combination of favorable policies, a well-educated labor force, and a large influx of direct investment from Hong Kong.
The recent acceleration of technical change in old and new fields such as microelectronics, telecommunications, and biotechnology is creating a more and more complex, competitive world in which adopting and adapting new technology is even more important. Successful policies will encourage both the most efficient use of established technology and its rapid diffusion through internal and external competition. Governments can improve technological capability best by providing education, fostering domestic and external competition, and encouraging the development of information services and quality control.
Labor flows and direct foreign investment
International flows of capital and labor affect growth and welfare in two ways. First, foreign inflows can finance domestic investment and help economies adjust to temporary shocks. (Official and commercial inflows are discussed in Chapters 4 and 6; this chapter looks primarily at the potential for foreign investment as a new source of additional capital, in light of the dwindling supply of commercial flows.) Second, foreign investment and labor migration are potentially important avenues for transferring technology. But the gains from foreign investment depend on the policy climate. Greater foreign investment in a protected domestic market could hinder development rather than promote it.
Labor movements Migration, transfers of skilled personnel, and returning workers from abroad all contribute to the diffusion of technology. After legal barriers were removed from the emigration of skilled workers in the United Kingdom (1825) and exports of machinery (1842), British entrepreneurs and workers helped to develop railways and coal mining in Europe and elsewhere. In the period after World War II, large numbers of foreign students received science and engineering training in the United States and then returned abroad to useand diffuse their knowledge. In Pakistan, a cottage industry in soccer ball exports was initiated by a Kashmii immigrant from India, who had studied the sports equipment business in Germany.
Labor mobility provides other benefits apart from technology embodied in migrating workers. It is another avenue for reducing the disparity in incomes worldwide. In several industrial countries, such as Norway and Sweden, high unemployment accompanied the transition from agriculture to manufacturing. Emigration helped to relieve population pressure in those countries: 25 percent of the Swedish population emigrated to the United States between 1865 and 1920. Higher labor mobility could improve welfare for laborscarce regions as well. The trade-increasing potential of regional integration plans put forth by such bodies as the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the Central African Customs and Economic Union (UDEAC) is likely to be limited. Yet these plans could alleviate unemployment or shortages of skilled labor in member countries if they permit greater labor mobility.
Looser immigration and emigration policies in both industrial and developing economies are likely to lead to global gains in human welfare.
One cost, however, is the loss of skilled and highly trained people emigrating to industrial countries the brain drain. In Bangladesh, the share of professionals emigrating abroad was so large that it is believed to have contributed to shortages in some professional categories. After completing their education, 63 percent of students from the Republic of Korea, 49 percent from Jordan, and 33 percent from Greece remained in the United States between 1962 and 1976.
The net losses from brain drain may be mitigated by other factors. Net remittances from migrants in France, Germany, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and some other countries are often high. Migrants send back from 10 to 50 percent of every dollar earned. In addition, emigrating workers may contribute to the diffusion of new ideas and technologies, either when they return home or simply by facilitating the exchange of information. In sum, the net losses from emigration of skilled workers are not clear. Governments can mitigate these (Table 5 .1). This is true even after capital intensity and firm size are taken into account. It seems plausible that a foreign presence could raise the productivity of firms that remain wholly domestically owned. For the three countries shown in Table 5 .1, however, the evidence on this is inconclusive.
The diffusion of management and marketing skills is likely to be as important as the transfer of product and process technologies. In Bali, Indonesia, and Taiwan, China, foreign investment has generated positive spillovers by overcoming the informational costs of entering world markets. Because foreign firms already have marketing linkNote: All averages weighted using firm sales. Foreign firms are defined as all firms of which at least 5 percent of assets are foreign owned.
Ratio of foreign firm to domestic firm productivity (output per worker). Equal to exports minus imported inputs divided by sales. For Morocco, equal to exports divided by sales because no data were collected on imported inputs. Despite its significant role for diffusing technology, direct foreign investment in an economy with highly distorted policies is likely to generate net losses for the host country instead of welfare gains. In Côte d'Ivoire (as mentioned above in this chapter), selective protection and subsidies to multinational textile firms led to inefficient production. Another study found that more than a third of foreign investment projects earned negative returns for the host country because of import protection. As shown in Table 5 .1, majority-owned foreign firms generated less foreign exchange than joint ventures or domestic firms. In all three countries, much of the manufacturing sector has been protected, so both foreign and domestic firms have concentrated on the domestic market. In addition, both Morocco (for phosphates) and Venezuela (for petroleum and aluminum) imposed restrictions on foreign ownership in sectors with high export earnings. Following the trade reform which began in Morocco in 1984, however, productivity and export sales increased faster in the foreign firms than in their domestic counterparts (Table 5 .1).
Host countries can maximize potential gains from DFI with evenly enforced investment codes, a low level of protection, and a minimal reliance on income tax breaks or credit subsidies to foreign firms. Taxes which restrict repatriation of profits also discourage direct investment. To reduce the possibility that multinationals could exploit their advantages in information and charge higher prices, host countries can encourage competition between foreign firms and avoid granting exclusive privileges to any one foreign investor. In Turkey, for example, liberalization of foreign investment has created competition among local joint ventures and licensees to upgrade the national automobile sector. It is best for local and foreign firms to face equal tax policies: a lower uniform tax rate is preferable to a schedule that discriminates for or against multinationals.
Foreign investors are also likely to prefer a clear regulatory system. A World Bank study of fortyfour international mining companies found that most of the companies surveyed preferred working within the bounds of a clearly defined investment and corporate tax code to negotiating individual agreements on tax breaks or subsidies. The Apart from potential gains through technology transfer, DFI generates employment, accounting for as much as 60 percent of manufacturing employment in some economies, such as Singapore. As DFI in industrializing countries continues to shift into services, its favorable effect on employment is likely to rise. DFI also shifts the burden of risk for an investment from domestic to foreign investors. Repayments are linked to the profitability of the underlying investment, whereas under debt financing the borrowed funds must be serviced regardless of the project's success. Table  5 .2 shows that DFI is the only capital inflow that was strongly associated with higher GDP growth during the period 1970-89, although the direction of causation is not clear. If DFI is likely to promote growth, the converse is also true.
Prospects for enhanced flows of DFI to developing countries in the 1990s remain uncertain. One study estimates that the share of developing countries in global foreign investment flows declined in the 1980s from 26 to 21 percent. In addition, DFI in developing countries is highly concentrated: in the 1980s, fifteen countries attracted 75 percent of all investment. DFI cannot be viewed as a substitute for commercial lending or official flows; it is at best a complement. The flow and effectiveness of DFI will be improved by adequate domestic and official financing by organizations such as the World Bank to support the expansion of infrastructure, health care, and education.
To sum up, direct foreign investment is a poten- Industrial countries rarely used nontariff measures during industrialization, although lately this has been changingwitness the increase in voluntary export agreements for autos and steel and the Multifibre Arrangement (MFA) for textiles. Yet for a sample of eighty-two developing countries, nontariff barriers were applied to 28 percent of all imports in 1987 (Table 5. 3). Overall, the evidence suggests that the industrial countries grew with somewhat lower tariffs and substantially fewer nontariff barriers than those employed today by Most of the studies which have analyzed GDP growth and openness to trade have found a positive relation (Box 5.3). Figure 5 .2 also shows that there is a positive association between productivity growth and trade and exchange rate policy, using seven different measures of openness. The accumulated evidence suggests that the long-run gains from increased competition and the spillover of technology are likely to be much greater than the short-term gains.
Yet a degree of skepticism is warranted for two reasons. First, most studies examine the relation between economic growth and trade volumes, not Second, interpreting the observed correlation between trade policies and growth is difficult. Policies that are not directly concerned with trade (macroeconomic policy, measures to promote domestic competition, and so on) may be responsible both for superior export performance and for high GDP growth. Moreover, it is difficult to establish the direction of causality between trade policies and growth.
Intervention and growth
The evidence supports two broad conclusions.
First, there is a general statistical association between less intervention and lower price distortions on the one hand and higher productivity growth on the other. Second, there is considerable variation in country experiencehence the dispersion of points around the general trends in Figure 5 .2. In part, this is because openness is only one factor which explains productivity growth; this Report also documents the importance of establishing macroeconomic stability, providing social services, and fostering a productive climate for enterprises.
Yet it is also true that such countries as Korea Productivity growth a Nate: The measures of trade liberalization, foreign exchange premium, price distortion, and change in trade shares are significant at the 5 percent level in a regression of GDP growth on openness, input growth (capital, labor, education, and land), and dummy country variables. The measure of bias against agriculture is significant at the 10 percent level. Data are averages for 1960-66, 1967-73, 1974-81, and 1982-88 , except for the trade liberalization index for 1978-88, which uses annual data because of the shortened period. The number of countries sampled ranges from sixty to eighteen.
Unexplained residual of GDP growth, after controlling for input growth and country effects.
This represents a proxy for trade and exchange rate policy, after controlling for input growth and country effects.
The relative price of consumer goods is purged of its nontraded component by taking the residual from a regression of this price index on urbanization, land, and population. See also Dollar, forthcoming. From a purely practical point of view, government intervention in trade is risky for several reasons. Countries often underestimate how difficult it can be to offset trade-induced distortions. A duty drawback scheme to reimburse exporters for tariffs paid on inputs is a second-best measure to attack distortions caused by protection. To ensure that incentives to produce for domestic and export markets are truly equal, exporters must also be compensated for any tariffs on their products (which shift incentives toward producing for the domestic market) and the exchange rate overvaluation that arises with protection. One study of Latin American countries found that export subsidies offset only a small fraction of the anti-export bias arising from tariffs and distorted exchange rates. In addition, countries which provide export subsidies become vulnerable to countervailing duties (imposed mainly by the United States) if they have signed the GATT subsidies agreement.
In many countries, the costs of failures in implementation have exceeded gains there might have been from correcting market failures. In Argentina and Côte d'Ivoire, efforts to distribute export credits to offset trade and exchange rate distortions were short-lived. Subsidies create financing problems and are often allocated to favored groups or sectors. In Costa Rica, subsidies for nontraditional exports were 5 percent of total central government expenditures in 1990; 80 percent of these subsidies were received by fewer than 20 firms.
Korea, which tied credits and subsidies to successful export performance, also made mistakes: the drive to establish heavy industry through widespread subsidies in the 1970s was at best only a partial success. Often, policies designed as shortterm measures to give domestic industries a chance to grow or restructure are never dis- What distinguishes the countries which intervened in trade and yet were also able to grow rapidly? First, the successful interventionists preserved incentives for technological change by maintaining international and domestic competition and imposing performance requirements in return for any credit subsidies, import protection, or restrictions on domestic entry. In Japan and Korea, subsidies and protection were strictly tied to achieving export success within a defined period. Companies which did not perform well were allowed to fold. In the Japanese synthetic fiber industry, MITT helped firms obtain licenses from several different national sources to ensure new entrywhich resulted in excess capacity and ruthless competition.
Successful intervention has also been tempered by a flexible, highly pragmatic approach. The ability to terminate special treatment when intervention fails is critical. In 1980, Korea quickly reversed its 1970s policies of broad supportthrough protection and subsidiesfor the development of heavy industry. In contrast, many industrializing countries have continued to subsidize ailing public sector firms and have restricted exit by poor performers.
Second, their intervention was moderate in the sense that it did not lead to large price distortions. Botswana, Canada, and Malaysia used relatively low tariffs and avoided nonprice measures such as quotas to diversify production. Measures of effective protection for Korea suggest that relative prices never became significantly distorted in favor of production for the domestic market (Westphal 1990). In part, price distortions were minimized in some of the East Asian economies because of their orientation toward global markets. Their commitment to world markets provided an external check on interventionist policiesguiding policy on exchange rates, protection, and subsidies.
In practice, few economies have successfully used infant industry protection to create viable, internationally competitive industries. The cost of government failures has been shouldered most often by the agricultural sector and by the consumers who pay higher prices for low-quality products. If governments do intervene, the guiding principles should be (a) to impose competition by fostering outward orientation and domestic competition, (b) to intervene at the source of the distortion (for example, to subsidize education rather than use protection when the problem is lack of human capital), and (c) to intervene only through nondiscretionary, time-bound policies that do not encourage rent-seeking. Economies which do choose to use trade protection should use low tariffs instead of nontariff barriers such as quotas or price controls.
Conditions for success in trade reform
In recent years a growing number of developing countries have embarked on programs of trade policy reform. Where these programs have been maintained, they have generally succeededthat is, both trade and overall output appear to have expanded as a result. But in many cases programs Box 5.4 Should states intervene in trade or shouldn't they?
Arguments for intervention
Selective state intervention has figured prominently in two of the impressive success stories of development: Japan and the Republic of Korea. Both countries employed taxes and subsidies, directed credit, restrictions on firm entry and exit, and trade protection to encourage domestic industry. In other countries, including resource-rich Canada, Malaysia, and Botswana, moderate intervention supported diversification of the export base and helped new industries get established (Lewis 1988). In Canada, moderate tariffs (10-30 percent) protected industry into the early twentieth century. The government did not use quotas or exchange controls, however, nor attempt to prevent the decline of uneconomic industries. In 1988, manufactures exceeded 50 percent of total exports. Malaysia has also employed modest tariff protection, but it has used exchange controls and import sparingly. Manufactures rose from 6 percent of exports in 1965 to 46 percent in 1988. In Botswana, which has one of the highest GDP growth rates in the world for the postwar period, the value of manufactured exports surpassed that of beef exports in the mid-1980s. At independence beef products had provided almost all of Botswana's export earnings. Although skillful management of the mining sector has been critical to success, modest use of import restrictions promoted both manufactured and horticultural production, with protection conditional on production at import-equivalent prices.
A long-term decline in the terms of trade for nonfuel commodities, combined with more inelastic demand for some of these products, suggests that countries could well boost export earnings by diversifying into manufactures. In the past, government intervention was sometimes necessary because producers lacked the information or expertise needed to enter industrial production (for example, Brazil, Korea, and Turkey).
A wide range of market failures, from lack of information to incomplete capital markets, could justify an industrial policy. High rates of return on innovation in agriculture and industry suggest that private agents may be underinvesting in research and development. For industry, less evidence is available, but several studies on industrial development of computers and computerized axial tomography scanners in the United
States suggest that consumer benefits from innovations have greatly exceeded research costs. An oftenmentioned failure concerns industrywide learning by doing. In principle, governments could use subsidies instead of protection to encourage domestic producers to learn by doing or enter markets with high setup costs. In practice, protection has been a more popular tool because it is more practical administratively and financially.
A recent argument for trade intervention calls for using trade policy as a strategic tool to give domestic firms an edge in global markets (Helpman and Krugman 1989; Brander and Spencer 1985) . When large ohgopolies compete in world markets, governments might want to subsidize national firms to shift oligopoly profits to them. Similarly, a government could try to subsidize the entry of national firms into global markets with scale economies that preclude more than a few players.
Arguments against intervention
The high costs of intervention in trade policy have been documented by a number of studies (Balassa and Associates 1971; Bhagwati 1978) . Even in the Republic of Korea, some prominent import-substituting projects were costly failures. The "Big Push" to develop heavy industry in 1973-79 contributed to real appreciation of the exchange rate, loss of competitiveness, and distortions in financial markets (Collins 1990) . GNP growth in Korea fell to 4.8 percent in 1980. It turned around again to 6 percent in 1981-82 following devaluation, liberalization of price and import controls, and tax reform. Where interventions have been successful, the evidence suggests that countries do better if the interventions result in neutral incentives. Success also depends on a time limit for the interventions. But most countries do not have the administrative capacity to collect all the information needed to ensure that interhave been only partly maintained, and often they have collapsed altogether. How far can countries and the international community (which also has a stake in these reforms) improve the chances that trade liberalization will succeed?
One study of thirty-six trade reforms in nineteen developing countries between 1945 and 1984 found that only fifteen of the reforms were fully sustained, nine were partially sustained, and twelve collapsed (Papageorgiou, Michaely, and 102 Choksi 1990). A study of trade reforms which accompanied World Bank loans in the 1980s found that many countries realigned their exchange rates and offset biases against exporters, and converted quotas to tariffs. Only a few of the countries examined, however, reduced their tariffs substantially. Evidence suggests the merits of phasing out quantitative restrictions rapidly, and reducing tariffs to reasonably low and uniform levels, such as a range of 15-25 percent. Experience supports a substanventions result in neutral incentives. And protected sectors may continue to lobby for protection of infant industries long after they mature. Europe and Japan provide examples from the industrial countries of the difficulty of trying to dismantle protection of agriculture.
Efforts to encourage diversification out of commodities and into industry have often resulted in high levels of protection for manufacturing sectors. In the process, many countries undermined their agricultural base and created industrial sectors that depended on indefinite protection for survival (for example, Argentina, Egypt, and India).
In practice, trade policy is generally not a desirable instrument for encouraging domestic industry. Although protection may encourage learning by doing by promoting productionand draw more workers to the protected sector, relative prices become distorted in favor of production for domestic markets. To offset the anti-export bias, additional measures are necessary, often resulting in a labyrinth of interventions.
The case for strategic subsidies to help national firms in developing countries compete on world mar- Despite these difficulties in implementing reform and sustaining it once introduced, liberalizing countries outperformed the others. A study of developing countries in the 1980s found that, holding other factors, countries that implemented trade reforms experienced a higher annual increase in GDP growth (Thomas and Nash, forthcoming). Growth rates for reforming countries were higher even when other effects were taken into account, including external financing, changes in the terms of trade, movements in the real exchange rate, and faster growth in the OECD countries.
Microeconomic aspects
Successful reforms have usually reduced the coverage of quantitative restrictions and the level and dispersion of tariffs. Quantitative restrictions may be phased out in various ways. Where product quotas are used, the quota ceiling can be gradually raised until the quota becomes redundant, a method used by Australia, the EC, and New Zealand. Where import licenses are used, licensing can be phased out by reducing the number of products to which licenses apply, making the licenses transferable, and shifting to "negative lists," which permit unrestricted imports of all products not listed.
Tariffs may be reduced either by making equally proportional cuts in all tariffs or by reducing the top rate to a target level, which is gradually lowered. A nonuniform tariff structure may in principle generate more revenue, with higher tariffs on goods with the most inflexible demand. Designing such a system, however, requires massive amounts of information and could also adversely affect income distribution. Equally important, nonuniform tariffs are subject to lobbying pres-. sures, raise administrative difficulties, and introduce the perception of inequity. Next to a no-tariff system, the best practical policy is to establish a relatively low uniform tariff structure and a dutydrawback program for exporters. Reforms to promote a more competitive domestic economy (discussed in Chapter 4) are crucial. Restrictions on market entry or exit, price and production controls, or regulations that reduce competition in the nontradables sector may dampen the expected supply response to trade reforms. In Mexico, entry barriers made it difficult for firms to respond to the new incentives. Until recently, regulations in the transport sector steeply increased the cost of shipping products to ports or the U.S. border. Regulations inhibiting exit by insolvent companies (such as bankruptcy laws and institutional or political constraints) also prevent improvements in the structure of production under trade reforms. Restrictions on exit partly explain the failure of earlier trade liberalization attempts in Poland and Yugoslavia. Such cases confirm one of Excludes data for Australia, Austria, Canada, Iceland, New Zealand, and Sweden. Source: Laird and Yeats 1990a. equal to the value of total official development assistance in that year. Action by developing economies to reform their trade policies must be met by equal efforts to reduce protection in the industrial world. But developing economies should not slow their own reform efforts simply because of rising protection in industrial ones. Yet both developing and industrial countries have recourse to policies which can make a significant difference (see also Box 5.4). In some low-and middle-income countries during the 1970s, inappropriate policies led to losses in market share and greater dependence on a few primary commodity exports. Industrial countries, which impose greater protection for goods at a higher stage of processing, discourage the development of local processing capacity for industrializing countries.
Regional trading blocs
The unification of Europe in 1992, the United
States-Canada free trade agreement in 1989, and the proposed inclusion of Mexico in the United States-Canada agreement could herald a new era of regional trading blocs. Although such blocs may constitute a step toward global free trade, it remains to be seen whether they will support or hinder the goal of a more open global trading system.
In principle, the formation of a trading bloc leads to net gains for its members when goods which were domestically produced are now imported from lower-cost partners. Other potential sources of gain include economies of scale and in- Table 5 .4 Intraunion trade as a percentage of total exports, 1960-87 creased competition from larger markets, particularly in countries with emerging infant industries and low domestic demand. Yet a trading bloc may also lead to losses if members replace lower-priced goods from outside the bloc with more expensive goods produced by other members. Even if a regional trading bloc can be designed to generate net gains for its members, these gains are exceeded by the benefits from unilateral trade reform.
What about primary product exporters? The evidence presented in Box 5.5 shows that primary product exporters also stand to gain from rising exports. The historical evidence (Table 5 .4) suggests that regional blocs in all but the EC have not generated a large share of total trade in the post-World War II period. Why? In a number of cases (CARICOM and the Central American Common Market in Central America; UDEAC in Africa) intraregional conflicts have made it difficult to liberate internal trade. In many blocs, such as the Andean Pact, participants sought to rationalize production by allocating specific markets to designated producers instead of allowing the competitive process to determine the allocation of production. These designated producers were not necessarily the most efficient; nor were tariffs low enough in relation to the rest of the world to provide external competition. Consequently, the expected benefits from rationalization of production or increased competition have been limited. Developing-country trading blocs have often imposed high tariffs or quotas against nonmembers, increasing the likelihood that net losses from the bloc will exceed gains. In addition, except in the EC, trading opportunities and pro-competitive effects have been limited by the small size of regional markets in similar products, limiting the opportunity to exploit differences in skills or endowments.
Do trading agreements between industrial and developing countries show more promise? Larger markets and greater differences in the structure of production could in principle generate greater gains for the participants. But such a strategy could also undermine the GATT and the multilateral trade system, and thus reduce the incentives of partners within such blocs to move toward global free trade. Other countries, reacting to the formation of such blocs, may set up their own network of trading blocs. Such a system is likely to reinforce current protectionist trends, and it could be a blow to developing countries' efforts to reform trade.
Unilateral trade liberalization and multilateral efforts to free up global trade are preferable to the formation of trading blocs; however, steps can be taken to maximize the gains from such unions.
First, members should commit themselves to multilateral reform and the GATT. The EC, for example, continued to participate in multilateral trade negotiations in the post-World War II period at a pace similar to other industrial countries (except in agriculture). Second, the external tariffs set by regional blocs should be reduced or limited to those of the most open member; meanwhile, internal efforts should concentrate on freeing up trade and ending efforts to allocate production. Third, participants should continue to move toward freer 108 trade through unilateral reforms. Postponing reforms to win agreement with other members of the trading bloc will greatly increase the costs of such arrangements.
Trade routes to growth
Openness to trade has improved resource allocation, increased competition and product specialization, and provided a broad avenue for technology transfer. Ironically, greater competition and a more integrated world have also resulted in a global trading system which is now poised at a critical juncture. The world faces two important trade challenges in the 1990s. First, regional trading arrangements must be carefully managed to ensure that multilateral commitments are strengthened, not forgotten. Second, and even more urgent, the Uruguay Round of trade talks must be revived. However difficult, all participants must reach agreement to open up agriculture, expand the GATT to eliminate quantity restrictions (on autos, steel, and textiles), and restrict the use of so-called fair trade legislation (anti-dumping and subsidy measures). In this, the developing countries can play a key role; in their own interests, they should press for free trade and continue to reform their own trading systems. The industrial countries of today grew prosperous through trade. No effort should be spared to ensure that the developing countries can follow that same path to progress.
